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RECENT DECISIONS
Such a reappraisal may portend difficulties for at least some manu-
facturers. A small manufacturer may find it difficult to obtain reliable
and responsible resellers when he is in competition with more powerful
suppliers or vertically integrated firms. Potential dealers may be re-
luctant to risk their own capital without such guarantees as are now
prohibited by the Schwinn decision. 6 Such dealers may be willing to
sacrifice some of their independence to protect their investments and
thus be inclined to accept an agency relationship. However, establishing
an agency relation requires a capital outlay which could well be beyond
the resources of many small manufacturers. A potential market entrant
will find it necessary to absorb the costs of setting up a distribution
system which is permitted by Schwinn 7 It would appear, therefore, that
while the Court recognizes the problem, the attempted solution is inade-
quate. Their solution both tends to decrease the ability of small firms to
effectively compete and increases market entry barriers. It is submitted
that a reexamination is necessary and this should include reconsideration
of the use of the rule of reason. Dennis P. Mankin
CONFLICT OF LAwS-JuRISDICTION-Minimum Contacts-The outer
limits of constitutionally valid jurisdiction are not exceeded by asserting
jurisdiction over a service corporation doing business solely in a foreign
state, if such corporation does a negligent act in the foreign state which
causes injury in the state of the forum.
Roche v. Floral Rental Corporation, 95 N.J. Super. 555, 232 A.2d 162
(1967), appeal docketed, No.-, N.J. Sup. Ct. (1967).
The third party defendant, J.C. Truck Equipment Company (hereinafter
referred to as J.C.), respondent on appeal, had moved to set aside the
service of the lower court on the ground that the court lacked in personam
jurisdiction over J.C. This appeal was taken from the granting of that
motion.
On May 6, 1963, plaintiff's decedent was killed when his car collided
Corp., note 25 supra; Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965)
(Treble damage action by franchisees against the franchisor of trademarked ice cream out-
lets in which the practices of exclusive dealing, tying arrangements, and restricted supplier
provisions were examined.).
36. See, Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 111 (1962); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman
Act, 75 HARv. L. RaV. 795 (1962).
37. It is not clear the extent to which the Schwinn decision continues the exemption for
new market entrants from the per se rule. 388 U.S. at 375, 87 S. Ct. at 1863. Compare, White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
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with a truck driven by one Burzo, while in the employ of the U.S.W.
Meat Packing Corporation. The truck had been leased to the U.S.W.
Meat Packing Corporation by the Floral Rental Corporation. Floral had
purchased the vehicle, an International Harvester truck with a refrig-
erated body from Gartrell Motors, Inc. Gartrell Motors had purchased
the chassis from International Harvester and hired J.C. to install a
refrigerator body on the chassis. The refrigerator body was supplied by
the U.S. Refrigeration Corp. Gartrell Motors, Inc., International Har-
vester Truck Company, J. C. Truck Equipment Company, Floral Rental
Corporation, U.S.W. Meat Packing Corporation, and U.S. Refrigeration
Corp. were joined as defendants in a wrongful death action brought by
the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that the U.S. Refrigeration Corp. and J.C.
were negligent in installing the refrigerator body on the chassis and in
repairing the refrigerator body. As a result the drive shaft of the refrig-
erator unit loosened and broke, causing the driver to lose control of the
steering of the truck.
J. C., a New York corporation, contended that the New Jersey court
had no in personam jurisdiction over it since it had no New Jersey office,
salesmen, or any other contact with the state, nor did it advertise or solicit
there. In fact, it appears that J.C. had consciously attempted to remain
intrastate. The New Jersey Superior Court concluded however,- "although
there is no direct proof thereof, we think it an inescapable conclusion that
a great many J.C. built trucks did enter New Jersey and that J.C. could
not help but expect them to do so."' The court held that this conclusion
provided the necessary minimal contacts for asserting in personam juris-
diction over J.C.
The assertion of jurisdiction is normally a two-step process as reflected
by the cases.' The court must first examine the local jurisdictional statute
to see if the case comes within the statutory norm. Second, the assertion of
jurisdiction must be within the constitutional limitations as prescribed by
due process of law. Given a broadly worded statute the courts of a state
may or may not exercise the jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by
the Federal Constitution.'
New Jersey has no long arm statute, but has decided to exercise in
personam jurisdiction to the limit of due process of law. Roland v.
Modell's Shopper's World of Bergen County Inc.4 In the Roland case
1. 232 A.2d at 167.
2. Adam N. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). If the court does not have local jurisdiction its
judgment will not be entitled to full faith and credit.
3. The court goes on to illustrate that the proximity of New Jersey to New York may
be the reason for its determination that in personam jurisdiction could be asserted over the
defendant J.C., see n.21 infra, and accompanying text.
4. "[W]e must bear in mind that our R.R. 4:4-4(d) permits extraterritorial service
subject only to 'due process of law'-that is, to the outermost limitations permitted by the
[Vol. 6:167
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there was a direct shipment of flammable leotards by the defendant dis-
tributor into New Jersey."
The court in Roland cited Hanson v. Denkla6 as authority for its find-
ing of jurisdiction. In Hanson the Supreme Court elaborated on the
"minimum contacts" doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.7
International Shoe involved the assertion by the state of Washington of in
personam jurisdiction over International Shoe Co., despite the fact that
the shoe company had no offices or warehouses in the state and was not
incorporated there. However, the shoe company had maintained salesmen
in the state, and the salesmen's acts of soliciting and order-taking were
deemed sufficient by the court to establish the minimum contacts (the due
process requirement) necessary to confer in personam jurisdiction.
In the Hanson case the Supreme Court ruled that the attempted asser-
tion of jurisdiction by a Florida probate court over a Delaware trustee
was invalid. The Delaware trustee had received its authority to act as
trustee before the settlor had moved to Florida and became a Florida
domiciliary; therefore, the administrator of the settlor's estate could not
get jurisdiction over the Delaware company since it had never initiated
contact with Florida.' To appreciate the significance of Hanson it should
be read in conjunction with McGee v. International Lije Insurance Co.,9
where the California courts were permitted jurisdiction over an insurer
by the Supreme Court because the insurer had mailed a single insurance
contract into the state and thus had initiated contact with the forum state.
Had the trustee in Hanson initiated contact it is probable that the Su-
preme Court would have allowed Florida to maintain in personam juris-
diction over the trustee.
Hanson has been interpreted as holding that there must be some con-
tact by the nonresident with the state by actions within the state, that the
nonresident should be receiving the benefits and protection of the state's
laws before in personam jurisdiction over him can be deemed constitu-
tional.' °
Federal Constitution. Our rule contains no definitions, limitations or exceptions . . ." 92 N.J.
Super. 1,10, 222 A.2d 110, 113 (1966).
5. However, in the instant case there was no direct shipment into New Jersey by J.C.
as noted earlier.
6. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. In Hanson, at 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), the Supreme Court states: "it is essential
in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protection of its laws."
9. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
10. See Comment, Contacts and Fairness: A Dual Test for Personal Jurisdiction, 11
STAN. L. Rav. 344 (1959).
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The court in the instant case stated that it was an inescapable con-
clusion that J.C. had shipped into New Jersey. There was, however, no
showing that J.C. had ever caused any item to be sent into New Jersey.
Neither soliciting, advertising, nor distribution of products had ever been
pursued by J.C. outside of New York. No product had ever entered into
the stream of commerce at J.C.'s initiation with J.C.'s knowledge. J.C.
had no control of the product when it left its establishment. J.C. returned
the product to Gartrell Motors, another New York firm having no knowl-
edge of the destination or control over the product after that. These
differences would distinguish Roche from the Roland, Hanson, and McGee
cases.
The Roche court cites various cases to support the evolution of the
expansion of in personam juridiction after the landmark cases of Interna-
tional Shoe and Hanson. The court was trying to break from the tradi-
tional views of Hanson, i.e., affirmative acts and minimum contacts. The
Roche court's reliance on proximity suggests that foreseeability of the
defendant's act may be the sole criterion used in lieu of traditional views.
An act done in one state with knowledge of a probable result in another
state will render the actor liable to in personam jurisdiction in such other
state for any harmful consequences. An example of an act where foresee-
ability alone will serve as grounds for jurisdiction would be the main-
tenance of airplanes. It is foreseeable that faulty maintenance of an
airplane could lead to harmful effects in any number of states. At the
other end of the spectrum are instances where foreseeability alone will
not suffice, such as a mechanic installing tires on a car with out-of-state
license plates." Neither of the two extreme cases present difficulty, the
difficulties arise in deciding the middle ground cases. The Roche case
involved a truck, possibly intended for local use, serviced by a local firm,
and sold to a local trucking firm. That J.C. could be held to be on the
polar side adjacent to airplanes is not immediately apparent.
Two cases which were cited by the Roche court as support for its
position are Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.,"2
and Feathers v. McLucas;'5 these two cases reflect the trend of states
other than New Jersey in relaxing or expanding the standards of Interna-
tional Shoe and Hanson. In the Longines-Wittnauer case the suit was for
breach of warranty with regard to machinery shipped to New York by the
11. In Erlanger Mills v. Cahoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956), the
court states: "let us consider the hesitancy a California dealer might feel if asked to sell a
set of tires to a tourist with Pennsylvania license plates, knowing that he might be required
to defend in the courts of Pennsylvania a suit . . . for 'heavy damages in case of accident
attributed to a defect in the tires."
12. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965), cert. denied, 382- U.S. 905
(1965).
13. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
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Illinois seller after contract negotiations in both states, execution in New
York of a supplementary contract, and rendering of services in New
York in installing and testing the machine. The New York court upheld
jurisdiction because of the recorded contract in the forum state.
It is difficult to see the reliance by the Roche court upon Longines-
Wittnauer, for there it was clear that the defendant had done something
other than an act merely foreseeable in its end result. The Longines case
was not a difficult case, the acts of the defendant in shipping a product
into New York clearly gave New York jurisdiction over the defendant.
In the instant case there were no acts of the defendant to join with the
foreseeability test to give the New Jersey court jurisdiction.
In the Feathers case the Court of Appeals of New York was given an
opportunity to make a liberal application of in personam jurisdiction as
the court in the instant case does.14 In Feathers the assertion of in per-
sonam jurisdiction was dependent upon the interpretation of a New York
long-arm statute."5 Plaintiffs had sued for personal and property damages
resulting from the explosion in New York of a tractor-drawn propane
tank manufactured in Kansas by the defendant. The tank was mounted
on wheels and sold in Pennsylvania to a Pennsylvania interstate truck
carrier. Defendant who had not sold any product in New York was not
amenable to process on the ground that he had transacted business within
the state. The statute was interpreted to read that only tortious acts
committed within the state were sufficient to subject a foreign corpora-
tion to in personam jurisdiction in New York. The act, which was alleged
to have been the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, had occurred
outside New York, was conceded to be negligent, and caused injury
within New York. These facts of the Feathers case seem quite parallel to
the instant case, i.e., an act done outside the forum state to a truck
which causes injury in the forum state. The New York Court of Appeals
declined to extend jurisdiction and reversed the lower court which had
held that the jurisdiction was valid, avoiding the constitutional question. 16
The statute was construed as not giving the court jurisdiction over the
foreign defendant. The court in Roche looks upon the narrow statute as
14. Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over A Products Libility Tortfeasor, 60 N.W.U.L. Rav.
730 (1966).
15. Since the Feathers decision the statute (N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 302(a)) has been
amended, see n.17 infra, and accompanying text. At the time of the decision it read as
follows:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... as to a cause
of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same
manner as if he were domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state .... (Emphasis added.)
16. This would appear to be the normal judicial process, i.e., to avoid the question
of the constitutionality of a state statute.
1967-19681
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the distinction between the Feathers case and its decision in the instant
case.
The Feathers court avoided the constitutional problem because of the
absence of definite activity by the defendant in New York. In Feathers
the defendant could foresee the eventual arrival of the truck in New
York. Still, the lack of a positive act by the defendant within the state
led the court to preclude itself from asserting jurisdiction. It is extremely
doubtful that even as liberally amended, the New York statute could
subject J.C. to personal jurisdiction.17
The court in Roche proceeded to utilize "fairness" as a basis for
asserting jurisdiction. 8 Even though the court felt that J.C. might not
foresee the destination of his product, it believed that "fairness" would be
served by applying the foreseeability tests of Phillips v. Anchor Hocking
Glass Corp. 9
These tests were the nature and size of the manufacturer's business, the
economic independence of the plantiff, the foreseeability of the manufac-
turer's product entering the forum state, the applicable choice of law rule,
the convenience of the forum, and the nature of the cause of action. °
The court in the instant case mentions the Phillips discussion of these
factors, but it was not clear to what extent, or in what manner the court
applied them. The court in Roche fails to mention, once again, that in the
Phillips case the defendant had voluntarily done acts within the forum
which, combined with the foreseeable consequences of his actions, would
subject the defendant to the forum's jurisdiction. The Roche court, in
applying the foreseeability tests of Phillips, goes even further than the
court in Phillips was called upon to go. It is submitted that the precedent
cited by the Roche court does not establish the principle that foresee-
17. The New York legislature has since amended N.Y. CIv. PRAc. § 302(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1967) to subject to personal jurisdiction a non-domiciliary who, in person or by an
agent:
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character
-arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed
or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and .derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce ....
It is apparent that J.C. did not derive substantial revenue from interstate commerce as
required by subsection (ii).
18. 232 A.2d at 166.
19. 413 P.2d 732 (1966), noted in 8 ARIZONA L. REV. 356 (1967).
20. Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 413 P.2d 732, 738 (1966).
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ability alone will suffice to permit a court to assert in personam jurisdic-
tion over the defendant in a tort action.
The Roche court attempted to limit its holding by stating: "Here the
normal usage of the product [truck] almost inevitably would bring it into
New Jersey. That is the deciding factor. It is therefore not necessary to
speculate upon what our holding would be if J.C.'s plant were further
away or in a different relative geographic location, or if J.C. completed
fewer trucks."'"
It is submitted that this case was an unexpected and unwarranted
extension of in personam jurisdiction. It is possible that without guidance
from the United States Supreme Court the Roche case, if followed, could
expand the jurisdiction of any state over any foreign corporation if the
state feels that the foreign corporation has wronged one of its domi-
ciliaries. Whether this is good or bad is not in question, but it is submitted
that to do it under the guise of minimum contacts when none in fact exist
is clearly erroneous. It would subject corporations to in personam juris-
diction anywhere without regard to state jurisdictional patterns of power.
It is time for the Supreme Court to clarify the jurisdictional guidelines of
International Shoe and Hanson.
Louis P. Vitti
CONTRACTS-PAROL EvIDENCE-Parol evidence rule does not bar testi-
mony concerning procurement of bank financing as an oral condition
precedent to the formation of a contract for home improvements that
did not mention financing, since the oral agreement did not contradict
the main body of the written contract, despite the inclusion of an "in-
tegration clause."
Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Johnson, 229 A.2d 163 (D.C. Ct. App.
1967).
Appellant sought to recover liquidated damages under a contract for
improvements on appellee's home. The contract in question contained
the following "integration clause": "This contract embodies the entire
understanding between the parties, and there are no verbal agreements
or representations in connection therewith."' Appellees testified that the
contract never came into existence because of an unfulfilled condition
precedent to the formation of the contract. Appellant objected to the
introduction of the testimony concerning the parol agreement for financ-
ing, and later objected to the jury being instructed to find for the
21. 232 A.2d at 167.
1. Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Johnson, 229 A.2d 163 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967), at 165.
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